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INTRODUCTION
The modern trust is an instrument of considerable utility for the donor who wishes
to retain control while giving. It offers the potential of skilled management, invest-
ment flexibility, preservation of value, administrative economy, and tax minimization,
through time and changing circumstances, for the benefit of successive beneficiaries.
The modern trust is a sophisticated property management device the efficiency of
which has been somewhat impaired by the inheritance of restrictive principles that
are not suited to its contemporary needs and purposes3 In most jurisdictions there
is legislation liberalizing trustees' powers in varying degrees, but frequently the
legislation is an unsatisfactory patchwork Previous uniform legislation dealing
with trustees' powers' has been limited in scope. The proposed Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act")4 does a great deal to bring the
law of fiduciary administration into line with current needs by substantially expanding
and making flexible the powers of trustees beyond their traditional limits.
In certain respects, however, the Act seems to provide greater scope to fiduciary
action than is necessary for the efficient performance of the trust function. Obviously
the expansion of the trustee's freedom in the interest of sound management is in
the best interest of the beneficiaries, but some of the liberalizing provisions of the Act
seem to serve primarily the purpose of fiduciary exculpation or advantage, particularly
with respect to the bank fiduciary-or at least so it appears to this writer. The
purpose of this article is to evaluate the Act generally, with some emphasis at appro-
priate points upon the manner in which it appears to afford advantages to the
corporate fiduciary at the expense of other values or interests.
*A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1951, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law.
'Fratcher, Trustee? Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627 (1962); See 2 A. ScoTr, LAw o
TRUSTS § 186 (2d ed. 1956).
'Fratcher, supra note i, at 628-29.
'UNIFORm COMMsON TRUST FUND ACT; UNIFORM£ FIDucrARIEs ACT; UNIFORI PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
ACT (1931); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr (Revised I962); UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION OF
FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERs Acr; UNIFORM TRUSTEES' ACCOUNTING ACT; UNIFORM TRUSTS Aar.
'The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act is set forth in its entirety in the appendix to this article. It was
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1964. It was enacted
in Idaho and Wyoming in 1965, and by Mississippi in 1966. IDAHO CODE ANN. §5 68-104 to IX13 (Supp.
I965); Wyo. STAT. ANte. W§ 4-36 to -45 (Supp. 1965); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 672-121 to -133 (Supp. 1966).
Charles Horowitz, the chairman of the committee that drafted the Act, has written an explanatory
article, Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REv. I (1966), and Professor Robert W. Hallgring has
written a critique of the Act, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic Principles of Fiduciary
Responsibility, 41 WAsn. L. REv. 8oi (z966).
THE UNIFomv TRusTE' PowERS Act 169
The text of the Act is printed as an appendix to the article for ease of reference.
It should be noted at this point that the Act applies only to the conventional express
private trust and charitable trust, and is not applicable to commercial trusts such as
the pension or other employee benefit trust or the investment trust
I
BACKGROUND
At the outset it should be mentioned that there is a certain air of unreality about
any controversy over trustees' powers, in view of the fact that the matter is almost
wholly within the control of the draftsman of the trust instrument. In a sense, the
innovations of the Act do not present a novel issue, since, for the most part, the same
provisions could effectively be included in any trust instrument. The body of law
that has developed to restrict the actions of the trustee is operative in the absence
of the grant of power by the settlor. Trust terms prepared by lawyers who are
experts in the field of trust law frequently contain a grant of powers that is not dis-
similar in substance from many of the provisions of the Act. So it seems that the
breadth of fiduciary power provided by this legislation has been, in substantial
measure, part of trust law right along, in the sense that such terms have been en-
forceable where expressed in the trust instrument; broad fiduciary powers, including
self-dealing and delegation of discretionary decision-making, have not been generally
considered contrary to public policy where that is what the settlor wanted.
What is proposed by the Act is that express negation in the trust instrument be
required if certain broad powers are not to exist,6 rather than that the grant of
broad powers be contained in the instrument if they are to exist. It may well
be said that the law as it presently stands, to the extent that it is restrictive of fiduciary
power where freedom of fiduciary action is desirable, or to the extent that the
existence or nonexistence of such power is in doubt, only serves to penalize those
whose counsel did not anticipate the particular power that subsequently seemed to be
called for. The impact of the Act upon fiduciary administration may not be as great
as appears at first blush.
The common law position has been that the trustee has only such powers as are
granted to him, expressly or impliedly, by the trust instrument; in theory, the
trustee is said to have no powers solely by virtue of his office 7 The implied power
is one which is necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes of the
trust, although not expressly granted. For example, if there is no provision in the
trust instrument expressly empowering the trustee to sell assets originally transferred
in trust, then the trustee does not have the power unless it appears from the nature
5§ i(i) of the Act.
o "The trustee has all powers conferred upon him by the provisions of this Act unless limited in the
trust instrument .... "§ 2(a) of the Act.
7 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 186 (i959); Fratcher, supra note s, at 627.
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of the property transferred, or the purpose of the trust, or language in the trust
instrument, such as that which speaks of "investing and reinvesting" trust assets,
that the power of sale is implied, as it usually is.8 The implied power is considered
to be reflective of settlor intention, however fictitious the application of the volitional
principle sometimes may be. The necessity to find an express grant of power or an
implied grant of power presumably has its origins in the feudal use, which came into
being for the purpose of avoiding certain feudal obligations or achieving certain
feudal goals otherwise unattainable and in which the holder of legal tide had few,
if any, duties to perform; the feudal holder of legal tide to the use of another was
usually something of a straw man. In the post-feudal, post-Statute of Uses period,
frequently the trustee's functions were strictly limited; the trust was often employed
only as a device for maintaining the continuity of land ownership in the family
line.' ° The trustee formerly was not viewed as an investment specialist as he often
is today.
It is obvious that a sophisticated court can find that the trustee has an "implied"
power if it makes sense for him to have it, so long as there is no express prohibition
in the trust instrument. There has been, however, much litigation concerning the
existence or nonexistence of trustee power where a good case could be made that
sound management called for the existence of the power; the idea that a power must
be "found" in the trust instrument at best breeds litigation and at worst obstructs
proper trust administration."- It should be stressed that legislation has been enacted
in most jurisdictions granting various specific powers to trustees which serve to
supplement the common law criteria for the determination of trustee powers.'2
s Church v. Church, 40 Cal. App. 2d 696, 105 P.2d 640 (1940); Sword v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 252
Minn. 544, 91 N.W.2d 75 (958); Agisim v. Tillou Realty Co., 56 N.J. Super. x8, 151 A.2d 421 (Ch.
1959); Will of Walker, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W.2d 94 (i95o); 2 A. Scorr, supra note I, §§ 186, 19o, go.1,
.2, .3.
' See T. F. BERGIN & P. G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 84-120
(1966).
'oFratcher, supra note x, at 658.
"See, e.g., Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Parish of Trinity Church, 25 Conn. Supp. 23, 195
A.2d 566 (Super. Ct. 1963) (power of trustee to make improvements on realty); Adler v. Adler, 216
Ga. 553, xz8 S.E.2d 456 (1961) (power of trustee to give an option to purchase trust property); Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Norton's Trustee, 255 Ky. 244, 73 S.W.2d 41 (r934) (power of trustee to give
a lease extending beyond period of trust); Estate of Dickerson v. Dickerson, 24 N.J. 513, 132 A.2d
805 (1957) (power of trustee to borrow money); King v. Pelkofski, 24 App. Div. 2d 1003, 266
N.Y.S.2d 61, appeal dismissed, 18 N.Y.2d 688. 219 N.E.2d 884 (1965) (power of trustee to mortgage);
In re Estate of Gould, 17 App. Div. 2d 401, 234 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1962) (power of trustee to sell on
credit).
"
2 E.g., the power to sell-LA. REv. STAT. § 9:1998 (950); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 203, § I9
(1955); N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAw § 127(2)(f) (MeKinney Supp. 1966); the power to grant options--FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 691.03(2) (1944); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 148, § 35(A)(I) (Smith-Hurd x964); N.Y. DEcED.
Esr. LAw § 127(2)(i) (MeKinney Supp. 1966); the power to sell on credit--R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 18-4-2(b) (Supp. 1966); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-25(B) (196o); WAsH. REv. CoDa
§ 30.99.070 (1959); the power to mortgage-FLA. STAT. ANN. § 691.03(16) (1944); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 320.964 (Supp. 1966); the power to lease beyond term of trust-CAL. CIV. CODE § 2272 (WCSt
1954); N.Y. DaEca. ESr. LAW § I27(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. x966); majority of trustees can exercise
powers-NEv. REv. STAT. § 163-zo (196i); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-IX (953); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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It should also be noted that the doctrine of administrative deviation or augmenta-
tion obtains at common law, by which the court authorizes the trustee to act where
there is no express or implied power; this requires that there be circumstances
sufficiently compelling to warrant a judicial alteration of the terms of the trust.
This principle may be employed to authorize trustee action which has been ex-
pressly prohibited by the terms of the trust, as well as to authorize trustee action in the
absence of express or implied power or any express prohibiton upon such action.
The doctrine of administrative deviation or augmentation is considered to be
applicable only in exceptional circumstances where strict adherence to the terms of
the trust would endanger the purposes for which the trust was created.3
II
"PRUDENT MAN" PowRs
The Act takes a significant step by empowering the trustee to do all things in the
management of the trust that a man of ordinary prudence and judgment would do,
subject at all times to his obligation as a fiduciary,'4 thereby going beyond the
traditional formula of the grant of power, express or implied, from the settlor. This
broad provision seems to empower the trustee to do what it is reasonable for him
to do in the management of the assets in trust, without the restrictions founded in
history and without resort to the frequently fictitious implied authority founded upon
settor intention.
The "prudent man" concept seems to have been taken from the doctrine of that
name which obtains in many jurisdictions with respect to the standard applied to the
trustee in his investment function 5 That is to say, given the power in the trustee
to invest trust assets, under the flexible prudent man investment standard the trustee
is not rigidly limited to certain prescribed types of investments but rather is empowered
to invest as a man of prudence and judgment would. 6 The prudent man standard
§ 36-34 (1966); the power of corporate trustee to retain own stock-statutes cited note 23 infra; the
power of corporate trustee to deposit in own banking department-statutes cited note 24 infra; the
power of corporate trustee to hold securities in name of nominee-statutes cited note 33 infra.
Several states presently have relatively broad trustees' powers legislation. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
691 (1944, Supp. 1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320-931-.969 (1950, Supp. 1966); WAsm REv. CODE
§9 30.99.oio.910 (959).
See generally Fratcher, supra note i, for a compendium of legislation dealing with trustees' powers.
"'Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., I5O Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d 1010 0957);
Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926); Carlick v. Keiler, 375 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.
1964); In re Trusteeship Under Agreement with Mayo, 259 Minn. 9i, io5 N.W.2d 9oo (i96o); In re
Estate of Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 193), afl'd mere., 237 App. Div. 808, 26o
N.Y.S. 975 (1932); REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TkuSrS § 167 (959).
"§§ 1(3), 3(a), 3(b) of the Act.
"See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CorIssIONERS ON UNFORM STATE LAws 265
(x964).
' The prudent man standard in the investment function was recognized in the leading case of Harvard
College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). This investment standard is also supported by
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TRuSTs § 227 (1959). The powers of trustee investment are now generally
the subject of legislation, and many jurisdictions have legislated the prudent man standard. E.g., KAN.
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has also been employed with respect to the trustee's general duty of care and skill
in the management of the trust estate.17
It should be noted that the Act provides that the conduct of the trustee under the
prudent man standard is analogous to the conduct of the prudent man in the manage-
ment of his own property. s But the Act apparently also provides that the trustee
under this standard is required to think beyond the present income needs in his
management, and is required to act as well to preserve the value of the principal for
subsequent beneficiaries; this seems to require possibly greater conservatism than
would be required merely for the protection of the prudent man's own interest."0
It should also be noted that the Act specifically provides that investment powers
generally are not affected by its provisions; the existing law as to trustee investment,
whether the prudent man standard or the legal list or some mix of these categories,
continues in effect. 0
For the purpose of determining the extent of the general duty of care that is
required of a trustee, any special skills possessed by a trustee, and representations by
a trustee as to special skills possessed by him, have been considered to be relevant;2 '
that is to say, the trustee may be held to a standard of care higher than the external
standard of reasonable care and skill which a man of ordinary prudence would
employ in the management of his own property, if he possesses such superior
skill or represents that he does.
Although the Act deals with "powers" rather than "duties," nevertheless these
concepts necessarily are very much interrelated. Obviously the trustee cannot be
empowered to do that which his duty of care prohibits; if the duty of care requires
more of the trustee than the external standard of prudence, then his powers must
also be so qualified. In view of this, it is unfortunate that the Act does not recognize
the applicability of these higher standards when appropriate; the absence of provisions
to this effect would seem to be protective of the trustee, particularly the bank
trustee, at the expense of sound fiduciary administraion. It is recognized that the
corporate fiduciary frequently possesses special skills, or at least represents itself in
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5004 (Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4054 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 564:18 (i955, Supp. x965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6o, § 16i (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. § x28.020
(1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-320 (955); WASH. REV. CODE § 30.24.020 (1955).1T RE TATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 174 (1959); 2 A. ScoTT, supra note i, 5 174.
58 § 1 (3) of the Act.
"The language of § z() of the Act is somewhat confusing-the action of the trustee must be
reasonable and equitable "in view of the interests of income or principal beneficiaries, or both."
o § 3(c)(5) of the Act.
5 1 Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, I42 N.J. Eq. 493, 6o A.2d 63o (Ch. 1948), aTd, 6 N.J. Super.
196, 7o A.2d 784 (App. Div. 1950), aff'd, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (195o); Will of Church, 22! Wis.
472, 266 N.W. 210 (1936); G. BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTE~s § 541 (2d ed. 196o); 2 A. Scorr, supra
note i, §§ 174, 174.. It probably remains conventional trust doctrine, however, that trustees are to be
held to the standard of prudence and judgment of the ordinary man, regardless of the special competence
possessed or represented. See Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S.W.2d 70 (946);
Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 148 A. 912 (1930); Note, Standard of Care for Corporate and Professional
Trustees, 42 VA. L. REv. 665 (1956).
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advertising or otherwise as possessing such skills. The failure to include specifically
in the Act these higher standards of prudence and judgment with respect to trustees'
powers seems to be without justification. But, in addition, the failure so to provide
results in a significant logical contradiction if the principles with respect to a more
stringent fiduciary duty of care are accepted. It would be most unfortunate if the
Act were to have the effect of limiting the development in trust law of the salutary
higher standard of care for those trustees that are specially skilled or purport to be so.
III
FIDuciARY SELF-DEALING AND DELEGATION
The Act empowers the trustee to do all acts that an ordinarily prudent man would
do in the Administration of the trust, subject to his obligation as a fiduciary. This
fiduciary obligation presumably requires the trustee to act in a selfless manner in the
interests exclusively of the beneficiaries and impartially with regard to the several
beneficiaries, although the fiduciary obligation is not defined in the Act. The Act
also sets forth a number of specific powers that the trustee is to have, which
enumeration does not limit the generality of the "prudent man" powers which he
has 2 Included among the enumerated powers are several allowing forms of self-
dealing and delegation of authority which are somewhat controversial.
A. Self-Dealing
Section 5 (b) of the Act provides that the trustee may engage in self-dealing
transactions only with the authorization of the court, except that the self-dealing
specifically authorized in several enumerated subsections of the Act does not require
such judicial authorization. The Act does not make any change in the law with
respect to the sanctions applicable to unauthorized self-dealing.
x. Retention of Assets in Which the Trustee Has an Interest
Section 3(c) () of the Act provides that the trustee is empowered to retain assets
received in trust from the settlor in which the trustee has a personal interest; this
form of self-dealing does not require any judicial approval. At common law re-
tention of such an asset would be lawful only if expressly authorized by the settlor or
if the retention would be necessary or appropriate for the carrying out of the purposes
of the trustP The Act permits retention irrespective of express or implied authoriza-
tion. Needless to say, under the Act retention is only permissible if the asset is other-
" See §§ 3(a), (c) of the Act.
23In re Estate of Ridings, 297 N.Y. 417, 79 N.E.2d 735 (1948); In re Durston, 297 N.Y. 64, 74
N.E.2d 3O (947); In re Trusteeship of Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 N.E.2d 755 (941); Child Estate,
15 Pa. D. & C.2d 257 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). Some states have legislated that the corporate trustee may
retain its own shares acquired from the settlor. GA. CoDE ANN. § 113-1518 (Supp. 1966); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 386.025 (x962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 363.200 (1952); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-i4 (Supp.
1966). See also 12 C.F.R. § 9.z2 (Supp. 1966), for the Comptroller of the Currency's regulation with
respect to retention by a national bank of its own shares. See generally Prochnow, Conflict of Interest
and the Corporate Trustee, 22 Bus. LAw. 929, 931 (1967).
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wise worthy of retention, and of course the trustee must deal with the asset only in the
interest of the beneficiaries. Under existing law, implied authorization to self-deal
in this manner may be found under appropriate circumstances, but it is obvious that
the retention of an asset in which the trustee is interested may be more easily rational-
ized and defended under the Act, however flexible the concept of the "implied power"
may be.
It is not clear that this liberalization of self-dealing is justified. If the Chase
Manhattan Bank is selected as trustee and one of many holdings transferred to it is a
block of its stock, why should the trustee be permitted to retain the shares, absent ex-
press authorization to do so in the trust instrument? An exchange for shares of a
comparable major bank would seem to be in the best interests of sound fiduciary
administration. Under existing law, it is possible to conclude that retention is im-
pliedly authorized, but there does not seem to be any compelling reason to make
retention more easily defensible.
Retention may well be justified where the shares of a closely-held small town
bank are transferred to it in trust, or where an individual trustee has an interest in a
closely-held corporation, shares of which have been transferred in trust. If uniform
legislation is to condone retention of assets in which the trustee is interested, then
it is suggested that the provision be more narrowly drawn than the relevant provision
of the Act.
Under the Act, if the asset is economically sound, then it seems that the standards
of prudence and fiduciary loyalty pose no obstacle to retention. But it seems that
retention should not be allowed unless the settlor intended it or there is a compelling
economic purpose to justify it. This broad self-dealing provision does not appear
to serve the interests of sound fiduciary administration.
2. Deposit of Trust Funds in Account with Trustee Bank
Section 3(c) (6) of the Act authorizes another form of self-dealing, the deposit
of trust funds in an account maintained with the fiduciary bank. The limits upon
this self-dealing are the requirements of management prudence and fiduciary loyalty.
But the standards of prudence and loyalty are gossamer stuff where the duration of
the deposit and the needs of trust liquidity are concerned. It seems that the law
should discourage the trustee from this sort of conflict of interest, although there is
a good deal of existing legislation permitting it.24
Is there any serious practical problem in requiring that deposits of trust funds be
made with another bank? If deposits in the bank fiduciary's banking department
were improper, it goes without saying that bank fiduciaries could, if they were so
inclined, cooperate with one another by exchanging fiduciary deposits, thereby in-
2 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-82 (g6o); IND. ANN. STAT. § x8-I209 (1964); MAss, GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 172, § 76 (Supp. 1966); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.763, 23.1054 (957). See also 12 C.R.
§ 9.io (Supp. 1966), for the Comptroller of the Currency's regulation with respect to national banks,
See generally Prochnow, supra note 23, at 934.
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directly achieving what could not be done directly, but this does not seem to be
justification for relaxing this self-dealing restriction. The law certainly should not
make it any easier for the fiduciary to serve his interests instead of the beneficiaries,
unless there is some advantage to the trust which outweighs the risk of abuse. This
does not seem to be the case here.
The danger of loss of deposits through bank insolvency has become remote, but
tight money conditions are very much with us from time to time. In these circum-
stances banks value their deposits dearly; the conffict of interest can be very real.
This type of self-dealing does not seem to be worthy of uniform legislative approval.
3. Trustee Compensation
Section 3(c) (2o) allows the trustee to set his own compensation, subject of course
to his responsibility as a fiduciary. Customarily trustee compensation is established
by statute, or by application to the court, if not provided for in the trust instrument.
What reason can there be for placing the burden upon the beneficiary to challenge
the reasonableness of the trustee's compensation, except the convenience and ad-
vantage of the trustee? This is about as flagrantly unjustifiable a form of self-
dealing as one could suggest. The Act seems to treat the payment of the trustee's
compensation as just another disbursement in the management of the trust. This is
rather disingenuous.
There are a couple of unusual aspects to this clause. The chairman of the com-
mittee which drafted the Act has stated that the provision is not intended to supersede
any existing statutory provision establishing the rate of trustee compensation or pro-
viding a procedure for determining compensation;25 there does not appear, however,
to be any basis in the language of the clause to support this restrictive interpretation.
If a court were so to interpret the section, then it would be meaningful in only a
limited number of jurisdictions, but it seems to be unjustifiable under any circum-
stances.
It is also curious that in the section 5 (b) enumeration of self-dealing practices which
do not require judicial authorization, the fee setting provided for in section 3(c) (20)
is not included. This literally means that section 5 (b) requires that the trustee
obtain judicial approval of his compensation. But if this is so, then what is the point
of including the trustee's compensation within the trustee's powers under section
3(c) (20) ? The matter is most unclear.
B. Employment of Specialists: Delegation, Self-Dealing, and Exculpation
Section 3(c) (24) of the Act is a very broad provision whose terms combine
elements of authorization of delegation, authorization of self-dealing, and fiduciary
2' Horowitz, supra note 4, at 23 n.27. This interpretation means that if a statute provides for aL
specific scale of compensation, or if a statute provides for a maximum fee within which the court deter-
mines compensation, or if a statute provides only for court determination of the trustee's fee, then this sec-
tion of the Act is of no effect. But if the court determination of the fee is a common law rule only, then
this section supersedes the rule. This result would appear to be somewhat questionable.
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exculpation. The trustee is empowered to employ-presumably this means pay a
fee to-such specialists as lawyers, accountants, and investment advisors, including
specialists who are "associated" with the trustee, to rely upon the advice of such
specialists without responsibility to consider its adequacy or quality, and generally
to delegate any fiduciary function to another person, whether or not the function
is discretionary. It should be repeated that the trustee always has a duty of prudence
in management and the duty to act solely in the interests of the beneficiaries, however
difficult those criteria may be to interpret and apply in the context of such a broad
grant of powers to deal with oneself and to pay others to perform trust functions.
An examination of the significance of these provisions as applied to the situation
of the bank fiduciary is appropriate. Does this section mean that a bank acting as
trustee can pay a fee to an investment advisor and rely absolutely upon his advice?
If the bank acts with proper care in its selection of the investment advisor, and if the
bank needs such advice, then it seems that there is no violation of the duty of
prudent management if the objective prudent man standard is employed; men of
ordinary judgment use investment advisors, and may well rely completely upon their
advice. There may, however, be some problem if the standard of prudence takes
into account the special skill possessed or-represented to be possessed by the fiduciary
bank, but, as noted above, the Act leaves the application of any such higher standard
in serious doubt. Assuming one applies the higher standard, the questions then are
these: Does a person of extraordinary investment or property management skill
employ investment advisors? If so, does he accept their recommendations without
examining and assessing the conclusions himself? It is not clear where the Act leaves
the matter. The authors of the Act certainly are aware that trust business is largely
handled by professionals, and must have intended that the provisions of this section
be utilized by banks.
The question remains why a professional fiduciary, in a time when trusts are
used for the purpose of obtaining the benefits of investment skill and flexibility, can
spend trust assets to get investment advice and, to make matters worse, accept such
advice without any obligation to assess its worth.26 It seems that if the professional
fiduciary feels unsure of its investment competence it should go out and hire people
" It is generally recognized that a trustee cannot delegate the power to select investments. Washington
Loan & Trust Co. v. Colby, 71 App. D.C. 236, io8 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Winthrop v. Attorney
General, x28 Mass. 258 (s88o); Tavenner v. Baughman, 129 W.Va. 783, 41 S.E.2d 703 (x947); RESTATE-
aENTr (SacoND) oF TRusTs § 171 (959); 2 A. Scotr, supra note i, § 171.2.
There is the related question of whether the trustee can properly employ investment counsel at the
expense of the trust, without delegating the selection of investments to the investment counsel. The
case law is very limited and inconclusive. Professor Scott states that it seems to depend on whether
the trustee would be expected to have the necessary skill in the investment field, "as in the case of a
corporation or individual holding itself or himself out as possessing the necessary amount of skill." 2
A. Scorr, supra note i, § 188.3, at 1402.
It is also generally accepted that the trustee has a duty to oversee the conduct of parties to whom
the trustee has properly delegated a particular trust function. McClure v. Middletown Trust Co., 95
Conn. 148, iio A. 838 (592o); Estate of Webb, 165 Pa. 330, 30 A. 827 (x895); 2 A. ScOTT, supra
note i, § 225.1.
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for its staff who possess such competence, or pay for consultant services out of its
own funds; and it seems that under any and all circumstances it should be liable for
investment action which falls below the fiduciary standard as adjusted for skills
actually possessed or impliedly or expressly represented to be possessed.
The Act goes even one step further and permits self-dealing in the selection of
the investment advisor; the word "associated" has something less than a precise
meaning, but it must include certain forms of self-dealing. It seems that the section
would permit the payment of fees to an investment advisor who was also an employee
economist with the bank fiduciary, or to an investment advisory firm managed or
controlled by a director of the fiduciary bank. Why cannot these advisors furnish
their advice when they are wearing their bank hats? To justify these provisions by
speaking of prudence and loyalty is to gloss over the issue; specific legislative powers
are not easily checked by means of generalized standards of competence and honor.
This type of legislative provision shifts the burden to the beneficiary to prove mis-
conduct where the opportunity for it is substantial, the standards are imprecise, and
the proof is difficult. Self-dealing and delegation should only be permitted when
the risks and expense are outweighed by the utility to the trust; it seems that the
burden is not met in this situation2 7
This section authorizes the bank fiduciary to pay a fee to an accountant to keep
the books and prepare the trust accounts, within the limits of prudence and loyalty.
Most banks have accounting staffs of their own, and it seems that if they are not
large enough to do all the bookkeeping for the trust department, the staff should be
increased. When the provisions for the employment of the outside investment
advisors and the employment of outside accountants are considered along with
the power to accept their recommendations and actions without review, the question
arises as to what the settlor who selects the bank fiduciary is getting for his money.
It seems that he may have purchased only custodian services.28
To say that most banks will not abuse the opportunities presented by these pro-
visions is, of course, no answer, nor is it any answer to say that the courts will be
"' There is substantial authority for the proposition that the fiduciary may hire himself or "associates" to
perform trust functions which are properly delegable. Norris v. Bishop, 207 Ky. 621, 269 S.W. 75! (x925)
(attorney); In re Estate of Tuttle, 4 N.Y.2d 159, 149 N.E.2d 715 (958) (accountant); Swank v. Reherd,
181 Va. 943, 27 S.E.2d 191 (943) (attorney); G. BOGERT, supra note 21, § 543(M). There is also a body
of law which denies the fiduciary the power to do so. In re Estate of Parker, 200 Cal. 132, 251 P. 907
(1926) (executor's law firm); In re Lundberg's Will, 197 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sur. Ct. 196o) (real estate
broker); Lightner v. Boone, 22! N.C. 78, 19 S.E.2d 144 (942) (attorney); Montaquila v. Montaquila,
85 R.l. 447, .33 A.2d ig9 (957) (real estate broker).
" It has been held that a trustee can properly expend trust funds to employ an accountant if it is
unreasonable under the circumstances to expect the trustee to do the accounting work. Hagedorn v.
Arens, io6 N.J. Eq. 377, 15o A. 4 (Ch. 1930); In re Loeb, 59 Misc. 2d 139, 86 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sur.
Ct. 1959); Ealer Estate, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 67 (Orphans' Ct. 1958). On the other hand, if the trustee
is capable of performing the accounting function involved, such expense is improper. Twist v. Twist,
221 Ark. 511, 254 S.W.2d 687 (1953); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Reynaud, 150 Misc. 821, 270
N.Y.S. 30! (Sup. Ct. 1933), afl'd mem., 239 App. Div. 904, 265 N.Y.S. 944 (1933); In re Estate of
Rich, 27 Misc. 2d 364, 211 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. i96o), afl'd mem., 13 App. Div. 2d 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d
246 (596); HahI Estate, 89 Pa. D. & C. 380 (Orphans' Ct. 1954).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
inclined to construe such provisions very strictly. To assert that the standards of
prudence and fiduciary loyalty are adequate safeguards is misleading. Within the
context of this Act, it cannot be said that it is imprudent for a bank to retain outside
investment advice, or accounting assistance, where the Act expressly recognizes only
the external standard of ordinary skill and judgment and makes no reference to the
subjective standard of possessed or represented extraordinary skill and judgment.
Within the context of this Act, it cannot be said that it is a violation of the fiduciary
duty to incur expense for investment advice or accounting assistance, if the bank
in good faith and with justification considers that it needs it; if the bank needs it,
there can be no breach of duty if the advice and assistance are obtained from "associ-
ates," to use the language of the Act.
This section seems to be an invitation to the bank fiduciary industry to pass on
certain costs to the trust, while at the same time reducing the risk of surcharge by
doing away with any responsibility for delegated functions. It is not suggested that
this is the purpose of the section, but it certainly affords that opportunity. It should
also be noted that the possible liability of the party to whom the trust function has
been delegated for failure to perform with due care is a poor substitute for the
responsibility of the prestigious trust company which has been selected as trustee in
part for its presumed financial soundness as well as its special competence.
It is, of course, arguable that competition will force trustees' fees to reflect
whether investment and accounting services are furnished internally or externally,
and consequently the trust consumer will not be disadvantaged by the power of
delegation afforded by the Act. This classical economic argument has a certain
logical appeal, but it is premised upon the existence of genuine competition, full
disclosure of trust administration practices prior to the creation of the trust, and a
sophsticated consumer class; whether these conditions obtain in the trust industry is
conjectural. Experience in many other consumer fields is not very reassuring. This
writer would hazard the guess that many trust consumers are likely to be dis-
advantaged despite the allegedly benign hand of the marketplace.
There is the further question of the relationship of section 3(c) (24) to the indi-
vidual trustee who is not possessed of business skills. Certainly an argument can
be made for allowing delegation of certain functions in his case. It may well be
that there should be different legislative rules for "amateur" trustees and professional
trustees. But in any event an evaluation of the Act must be made upon the basis
of its effect upon the professional trustee in view of its predominant position in the
field.
Delegation to attorneys is a somewhat different matter.29 Most banks do not have
2 There is no question that a trustee may properly employ an attorney with respect to legal ques-
tions which are beyond the competence of the layman, and delegate such duties to him as a layman
would in connection with the management of his property. Estate of Barbikas, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 34r
P.2d 32 (r959); Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose, Gas Light Co., 234 Mass. 374, 125 N.E. 626 (192o); in re
Estate of Wharton, 47 N.J. Super. 42, 135 A.2d x87 (App. Div. 1957); G. BooERT, spra note 21, 5 556;
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house counsel staffs. Usually the trust officer is not as qualified to judge the sound-
ness of the attorney's advice or action as he is to evaluate the advice or action
of the investment advisor. Most settlors probably do not consider that in appointing
a bank fiduciary they are buying legal services which may be required in the course
of the administration of the trust; on the other hand the settlor probably considers
that he is buying necessary accounting and investment services. However, the power
to self-deal with lawyers who are, let us say, directors of the fiduciary bank, is prob-
ably inadvisable. There is usually no difficulty in finding competent lawyers who
are "unassociated" to handle trust matters. Certainly in many areas the banking
industry and elements of the legal community have a close relationship, but there is
no point in enacting uniform legislation which condones less than arm's length
dealing.
The last clause of the section broadly authorizing the delegation of any act of
fiduciary administration, whether or not discretionary, probably is intended to cover
individual trustee illness and absence from the country and the likeY0  But it is
broad enough to cover anything including delegation of discretionary distributions of
income and principal. Under this clause there can also be broad delegation to a
co-trustee. Once again, the standards of ordinary skill and judgment and fiduciary
loyalty are supposed to be the limits of the power. It is also provided in section 4 of
the Act that the trustee cannot transfer his office or the entire administration of the
trust to a co-trustee or other person-now there is an objective limit! Just what this
open-ended provision for delegation really entitles the trustee to do would have to
await judicial construction.
IV
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. Securities Need Not Be "Earmarked" As Held in Trust
Section 3(c)(i6) of the Act empowers the trustee to hold securities in the name
of a nominee or in other form which does not disclose the fact that the security is
held in trust, in order that title may be transferable without difficulty. The common
law view has been that the trustee must "earmark" trust assets as such, in order
to protect against the possibility of confusion of trust property and individual property
of the trustee and the confusion of the assets of different trusts, and to protect
against the manipulation by the trustee of trust assets and individual assets in the
event of fluctuating asset values31 It has also been the common law view that one who
2 A. Scoyr, supra note i, §§ 171.2, 188.3. There is legislation in some states expressly recognizing
the need of a fiduciary to retain legal counsel in connection with the administration of a trust. E.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 58, § 5 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1717 (1949); MICts STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(285)
(r962). The trustee who employs or delegates to an attorney must, however, oversee the actions of the
attorney within the limits of his competence. McClure v. Middletown Trust Co., 95 Conn. 148, xo A. 838
(1920).
so See Horowitz, supra note 4, at 24.
"' See 2 A. Scorr, supra note I, H9 179, 179.1, .2, .3.
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knowingly purchased a trust asset from a trustee or participated in the transaction was
bound to make diligent inquiry as to the trust terms and any violation thereof.3 2 As
applied to securities which were regularly traded, the requirement of earmarking made
sales by a trustee extremely cumbersome. As a consequence, statutes were enacted
in a number of jurisdictions authorizing corporate trustees to hold securities in other
than the fiduciary name s The advantages of commerce in such property were con-
sidered to outweigh the dangers of the absence of earmarking.
There have also been statutes which protect the purchaser from the trustee, and
those participating in the transaction, who know that trust property is being trans-
ferred but have no knowledge of any breach of trust terms;34 most recently, sections
8-304 and 8-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code protect the good faith purchaser
of securities held in trust and third parties involved in the transaction.
While section 3(c) (I6) empowers the trustee to hold securities in other than
the name of the trustee in order to facilitate transfers, section 7 of the Act provides
that parties who deal with the trustee may safely assume that the trustee is acting
within his powers. So it seems that within the terms of the Act itself the fact of
earmarking of trust property does not interfere with commerce in securities. Since
the purpose of not earmarking securities is no longer relevant, it seems that the tradi-
tional rule requiring earmarking should be retained. Sound fiduciary administra-
tion would require earmarking unless there is a compelling reason for doing away
with it.35
This writer, however, has been advised that nominee registration makes life
simpler administratively at the bank. In addition, under the rules of the New York
Stock Exchange, a certificate in the name of a fiduciary is not deemed to be good
deliveryY6 It may be that the exchange should change its rule, but until it does it
seems that nominee registration is called for. The exchange rule does not seem
to be necessary any longer, but it may well serve the administrative convenience of
banks and brokers.
B. Duty to Retain Tax Advantages
Section 3 (b) prohibits a trustee from exercising his broad powers under the Act
in such a way as to deprive the trust or donor of a "tax exemption, deduction, or
credit," or "impose a tax upon a donor or other person as owner of any portion of
the trust." The taxes referred to include any federal, state, or local income, gift,
estate, or inheritance tax.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 296, 297, 325, 326 (1959); 3 A. Scorr, supra note s,
99 296, 297, 325, 326; Fratcher, supra note I, at 645-46.
"
3 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-81 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 915 (r953); IND. ANN. STArT.
§ 18-1213 (1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9-1607 (x964); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 167, § 54 (x959).
"' Uniform Fiduciaries Act, which has been adopted in more than twenty states; Uniform Simplifica-
tion of Fiduciary Security Transfers Act, which has been adopted in more than thirty-five states. See
also Fratcher, supra note I, at 647-49.
" See Fratcher, supra note x, at 663.
"' NYSE Rule 201, 2 CCH NYSE Guide para. 2201.
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The chairman of the committee that drafted the Act has noted the relationship
of this clause to the exempt charitable trust under section 5ox (c) (3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, the grantor trust under Code sections 671 through 678, and
the marital deduction trust under Code section 2o56. He points out that a trustee
of an exempt charitable trust who engaged in a prohibited transaction as defined in
section 503 of the Code which would cause the loss of the exempt status would be in
violation of the Act; on the other hand, the trustee of an exempt trust who invests
so as to produce unrelated business income as defined in Code sections 511-15, is not
in violation of the Act since he has not destroyed the exempt status of the trust, but
merely subjected it to some tax liability. This appears to be a rather fine reading of
section 3(b). He also points out that the Act denies to the trustee the power to do
any of the things described in Code section 675, and states, by way of example, that
section 3 (b) would not prohibit a trustee from disposing of tax-exempt bonds and
reinvesting in taxable assets.
It seems that the breadth of the language of the section and the variety of taxes
to which it relates would cause considerable concern to a trusteeYs
C. Other Departures from Historical Restrictions
The Act has a number of specific provisions which expand trustee powers
in a manner which would free fiduciary administration from certain limitations of
its restrtictive historical legacy. Section 3(c) (3) broadly empowers the trustee to
operate a business, subject of course to the limitation of the prudence of such action
with respect to the preservation of principal as well as the production of income.
Section 3(c) (7) frees the trustee to acquire or dispose of an asset on credit, and to
encumber a trust asset for a valid trust purpose. Sections 3(c) (8), (9), (io), and
(ix) free the trustee's hand in the management and improvement of real property
held in trust. Section 3(c) (12) empowers the trustee to give options to purchase
trust property. Section 3(c) (3) gives the trustee broad power to vote stock by
proxy.
Section 3(c)(18) empowers the trustee to borrow money for the trust. Section
3(c) (22) permits the trustee to make distribution to a relative of a beneficiary who
is under disability, or to the beneficiary himself, in the absence of a legal repre-
sentative. Section 6 allows a majority of the trustees to act for the trust if there
are three or more trustees, with exculpation provided for any dissenting trustee. As
previously indicated, section 7 contains provisions that serve to protect the third
party who deals with the trustee; broad third party protection is particularly neces-
"T Horowitz, supra note 4, at 13-16.
"s Rev. Rul. 144, 1965-I Ctmi. BULL. 442, ruled invalid as contrary to public policy, as clause in a
trust instrument providing that a power in a trustee to divert principal to noncharitable "income" bene-
ficiaries was to be of no effect if the consequence of such power was to make a charitable remainder not de-
ductible for federal gift or income tax purposes. Horowitz, supra note 4, at i6 n.86, distinguishes such a
clause from section 3(b) of the Act on the ground that the latter is a statutory prohibition.
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sary if the powers of the trustee are to be liberalized to enable him to do whatever
is prudent in the management of the trust.
Section 5(a) recognizes the existing power of the court to authorize deviation
from administrative restrictions upon the trustee imposed by the trust instrument
or the Act. The wording of this section is such that it could be construed to liberalize
the power of the court to authorize deviation-that is, to authorize it when it would
be simply advantageous to the trust to do so, rather than only in the event of cir-
cumstances which threaten to impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust. The liberalization of the doctrine of deviation, however, does not seem to
have been the intent of those who drafted the Act.39
V
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The basic concept of the Act, namely the establishment of a flexible, common-
sense standard to determine the scope of trustees' powers, is certainly sound. What
is proposed approaches in principle the commendable idea of powers existing by
virtue of the office or function. But unfortunately it is here at the very foundation
that a flaw appears.
The Act establishes as its fundamental standard the conduct of the man of
ordinary prudence and judgment. But modern fiduciary responsibility is largely in
the hands of the trust companies, the institutional experts, who usually possess, and
necessarily represent that they possess, special competence in the management
of property. The better thinking in the fiduciary field supports the proposition
that the standard of care and skill should be as extensive as the level of competence
of the trustee, in fact or represented. But the Act does not reflect this higher
standard. The Act deals with powers, but obviously the powers of the trustee are,
to a considerable degree, the function of his duties, and cannot fall below the level
of his duties. If the failure to include this higher standard in the definition of the
fundamental principle of trustee power in the Act was a drafting oversight, then
it should be corrected; if the omission was deliberate, then the effect of the Act would
seem to be the unhappy one of the downgrading of fiduciary responsibility.
Since this issue permeates the entire Act, it should be discussed before the Act is
given further consideration by legislatures. If the Act is widely adopted without
change in this regard, it will be viewed by many as a regressive step.
The self-dealing aspects of the Act are troublesome. Retention of assets in which
the trustee is personally interested, deposits of trust funds with the trustee bank,
trustee determination of its own compensation, and trustee delegation to "associates,"
are all allowed without court authorization. Prudence and loyalty are set up as the
bulwarks against abuse. Why were self-dealing purchases and sales omitted? Why
" Horowitz, supra note 4, at 25-26.
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are not the duties of prudence and loyalty sufficient protection against abuse there as
well? Self-dealing conflicts with the fiduciary idea, and it should only be permitted
where advantage to the trust outweighs the risk involved. If there is a place in
uniform legislation for self-dealing without judicial or settlor authorization, it should
be narrowly and tightly defined. This has not been done in the Act.
The breadth of the delegation authority in the Act is remarkable in light of the
predominant position of the institutional fiduciary. If the judicial opposition to
delegation by the trustee was originally founded on settlor confidence in the desig-
nated individual, today opposition to delegation can be rationalized in terms of the
settlor expectation when he chooses a many-faceted financial-fiduciary institution as
his trustee. There may well be matters and situations which call for delegation of
the fiduciary function, particularly with respect to the individual trustee, but uniform
legislation should attempt to define them with greater precision than merely the limits
of prudence and loyalty.
The Act provides that all its terms can be negated by the settlor in the trust
instrument. Such negation is, of course, subject to the equity power to order or
authorize deviation when the the settlor's restraints threaten the broader purposes
of the trust. But this is a remedy reserved for the extraordinary situation. The issue
that this provision of the Act raises is that of dead-hand control. It is accepted in
trust law that the settlor is free to give his property on his own administrative terms.
The Act purports to provide the trustee great freedom of action, but it leaves room
for the settlor to say "no" and thereby impose his will upon the living long after his
death. The question is whether settlor control over presumably salutary statutory
powers is sound policy. It can be argued that settior control over the management of
trust property should be strictly limited. A reappraisal of dead-hand control over
wealth is long overdue. Fiduciary powers is only one aspect of a larger problem °
In this connection, section 5(a) of the Act confirms the doctrine of administrative
deviation, and apparently there was no intention to expand it although the language
of the section could be construed to do so.l A strong argument can be made for the
proposition that the court should be empowered to authorize deviation from
restrictive administrative terms in the trust instrument when it would be to the
advantage of the trust to do so. It may be advisable to restate the clause to effect
clearly a liberalization of the law in this regard.
Should legislatures enact the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act? This writer thinks
not, at least in its present form. This is not to say that it is not a thoughtful product
with many valuable features. But on balance, it does not seem to be a truly pro-
gressive step in the development of trust law.
'
0 See L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955); W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED 31-
49 (1967); Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HAsrINGS
L.J. 267 (1967).
,11 See Horowitz, supra note 4, at 25-26.
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF THE UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT
§ i. [Definitions]
As used in this Act:
(i) "trust" means an express trust created by a trust instrument, including a will,
whereby a trustee has the duty to administer a trust asset for the benefit of a named or
otherwise described income or principal beneficiary, or both; "trust" does not include a
resulting or constructive trust, a business trust which provides for certificates to be issued
to the beneficiary, an investment trust, a voting trust, a security instrument, a trust created
by the judgment or decree of a court, a liquidation trust, or a trust for the primary purpose
of paying dividends, interest, interest coupons, salaries, wages, pensions or profits, or em-
ployee benefiits of any kind, an instrument wherein a person is nominee or escrowee for
another, a trust created in deposits in any financial institution, or other trust the nature of
which does not admit of general trust administration;
(2) "trustee" means an original, added, or successor trustee;
(3) "prudent man" means a trustee whose exercise of trust powers is reasonable and
equitable in view of the interests of income or principal beneficiaries, or both, and in view
of the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, diligence, discretion, and judgment
would act in the management of their own affairs.
Commissioners' Note
What is "reasonable and equitable" in the exercise of trust powers will be determined
as of the time of exercise.
§ z. [Powers of Trustee Conferred by Trust or by Law]
(a) The trustee has all powers conferred upon him by the provisions of this Act unless
limited in the trust instrument [and except as is otherwise provided in .
(b)An instrument which is not a trust under section i(i) may incorporate any part
of this Act by reference.
§ 3- [Powers of Trustees Conferred by this Act]
(a) From time of creation of the trust until final distribution of the assets of the
trust, a trustee has the power to perform, without court authorization, every act which a
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust including but not limited to the
powers specified in subsection (c).
(b) In the exercise of his powers including the powers granted by this Act, a trustee
has a duty to act with due regard to his obligation as a fiduciary, including a duty not to
exercise any power under this Act in such a way as to deprive the trust of an otherwise
available tax exemption, deduction, or credit for tax purposes or deprive a donor of a trust
asset of a tax exemption, deduction, or credit or operate to impose a tax upon a donor or
other person as owner of any portion of the trust. "Tax" includes, but is not limited to, any
federal, state, or local income, gift, estate, or inheritance tax.
(c) A trustee has the power, subject to subsections (a) and (b):
(i) to collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor until, in the
judgment of the trustee, disposiiton of the assets should be made; and the assets may
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be retained even though they include an asset in which the trustee is personally in-
terested;
(2) to receive additions to the assets of the trust
(3) to continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enterprise,
and to effect incorporation, dissolution, or other change in the form of the organization
of the business or enterprise;
(4) to acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any
trust capacity, holds an undivided interest;
(5) to invest and reinvest trust assets in accordance with the provisions of the
trust or as provided by law;
(6) to deposit trust funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the trustee;
(7) to acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on credit, at public or private
sale; and to manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or
abandon a trust asset or any interest therein; and to encumber, mortgage, or pledge
a trust asset for a term within or extending beyond the term of the trust, in con-
nection with the exercise of any power vested in the trustee;
(8) to make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other
structures, to demolish any improvements, to raze existing or erect new party walls or
buildings;
(9) to subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; or to make or obtain
the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries; or to adjust differences in valuation on
exchange or partition by giving or receiving consideration; or to dedicate easements
to public use without consideration;
(io) to enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without
option to purchase or renew for a term within or extending beyond the term of the
trust;
(ii) to enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or
other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement;
(2) to grant an option involving disposition of a trust asset, or to take an option
for the acquisition of any asset;
(3) to vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy;
(4) to pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or
on account of securities;
(5) to sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; to consent, directly or
through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, dis-
solution, or liquidation of a corporation or other business enterprise;
(z6) to hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure
of the trust, so that title to the security may pass by delivery, but the trustee is liable
for any act of the nominee in connection with the stock so held;
(7) to insure the assets of the trust against damage or loss, and the trustee against
liability with respect to third persons;
(18) to borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; to advance
money for the protection of the trust, and for all expenses, losses, and liabilities
sustained in the administration of the trust or because of the holding or ownership of
any trust assets, for which advances with any interest the trustee has a lien on the
trust assets as against the beneficiary;
(i9) to pay or contest any claim; to settle a claim by or against the trust by com-
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promise, arbitration, or otherwise; and to release, in whole or in part, any claim
belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim is uncollectible;
(20) to pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other expenses
incurred in the collection, care, administration, and protection of the trust;
(21) to allocate items of income or expense to either trust income or principal,
as provided by law, including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation,
obsolescence, or amortization, or for depletion in mineral or timber properties;
(22) to pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary under legal disability, without
liability to the trustee, by paying the sum to the beneficiary or by paying the sum
for the use of the beneficiary either to a legal representative appointed by the court,
or if none, to a relative;
(23) to effect distribution of property and money in divided or undivided interests
and to adjust resulting differences in valuation;
(24) to employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, or
agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist the trustee in
the performance of his administrative duties; to act without independent investigation
upon their recommendations; and instead of acting personally, to employ one or more
agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary;
(25) to prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of
trust assets and of the trustee in the performance of his duties;
(26) to execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate the
exercise of the powers vested in the trustee.
§ 4- [Trustees Office not Transferable]
The trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire administration
of the trust to a cotrustee or another.
§ 5. [Power of Court to Permit Deviation or to Approve Transactions Involving Conflict of
Interest]
(a) This Act does not affect the power of a court of competent jurisdiction for cause
shown and upon petition of the trustee or affected beneficiary and upon appropriate notice
to the affected parties to relieve a trustee from any restrictions on his power that would
otherwise be placed upon him by the trust or by this Act.
(b) If the duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest as trustee of
another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may be exercised only by
court authorization (except as provided in sections 3(c) (), (4), (6), (i8), and (24))
upon petition of the trustee. Under this section, personal profit or advantage to an affiliated
or subsidiary company or association is personal profit to any corporate trustee.
§ 6. [Powers Exercisable by Joint Trustees-Liability]
(a) Any power vested in 3 or more trustees may be exercised by a majority, but a
trustee who has not joined in exercising a power is not liable to the beneficiaries or to
others for the consequences of the exercise; and a dissenting trustee is not liable for the
consequences of an act in which he joins at the direction of the majority of the trustees,
if he expressed his dissent in writing to any of his cotrustees at or before the time of the
joinder.
(b) If 2 or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust, and if any of them is unable
or refuses to accept the appointment, or, having accepted, ceases to be a trustee, the
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surviving or remaining trustees shall perform the trust and succeed to all the powers,
duties, and discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly.
(c) This section does not excuse a cotrustee from liability for failure either to par-
ticipate in the administration of the trust or to attempt to prevent a breach of trust.
§ 7. [Third Persons Protected in Dealing with Trustee]
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee in the
conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust power and their proper exercise by the
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to inquire
whether the trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the power; and a third
person, without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if the trustee possessed and
properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to
assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee.
§ 8. [Application of Act]
Except as specifically provided in the trust, the provisions of this Act apply to any
trust established [before or] after the effective date of this Act [and to any trust asset
acquired by the trustee [before or] after the effective date of this Act].
Commissioners' Note
If the bracketed provisions are included in the Act as adopted, the provisions of this
section will not affect the validity of any act of the trustee performed prior to its enactment.
§ 9. [Uniformity of Interpretation]
This Act shall be construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
of those states which enact it.
§ io. [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the "Uniform Trustees' Powers Act."
§ ixi. [Severability]
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the pro-
visions of this Act are severable.
§ 12. [Repealed]
The following acts are repealed:
(I)
(2)
(3)
§ 13. [Time of Taking Effect]
This Act takes effect

